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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Second Municipal Bank-
ruptcy Act-Appellant, an insolvent California irrigation district,
presented a petition for confirmation of a composition under the Second
Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act.' A California statute 2 authorized
any taxing district to file such petitions under the "Federal Bankruptcy
Statute". The district court, in ruling on a motion filed by dissenting
bondholders, decided 3 that the Act was an unconstitutional invasion of
state sovereignty. On appeal to the Supreme Court,4 held (two justices
dissenting), that the Act is constitutional since the State of California had
agreed to permit its instrumentalities to submit to it. United States v.
Bekins, 3o4 U. S. 27 (1938).
The Sumners Act 5 was held unconstitutional in Ashton v. Cameron
County Water Improvement District No. 1,6 discussed in a previous issue
of this REvIEW, 7 on the ground that by including political subdivisions of
the states within its terms it encroached on the limits of state sovereignty.
The new Act was passed with the idea of circumventing this decision.8
However, the district court ruled that since its provisions were so similar
to those of the Sumners Act it was within the terms of the Ashton decision.
The instant case admitted that this Act, like the Sumners Act, is an in-
vasion of state sovereignty, but held that it is a permissible one since the
state had already given its consent. But it qualifies this rule 9 by providing
that in so consenting the state can act only in aid and not in derogation
of its sovereign powers.' 0 Undoubtedly, the Court reached a salutary re-
sult; for if it had decided otherwise, both sovereigns would have been help-
less, since any state law which cancelled pre-existing indebtedness would
violate Article I § 1o of the Constitution." However, by giving its consent
the state necessarily relinquishes a portion of its sovereignty; therefore, it
would seem that the limitation defeats the rule. Moreover, it is difficult
to reconcile this decision with the holding of the Ashton case where the
state had also given its consent but the Court said that "neither consent nor
submission by the States can enlarge the power of Congress" .
2
I. 50 STAT. 653 (i937), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 4o-4o4. This was re-enacted as Chap-
ter IX of the Chandler Act. Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 22, 1938)
§§ 81-84.
2. Cal. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1934, c. 4.
3. In re Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District, 21 F. Supp. 129 (S. D. Cal. 1937),
86 U. oF PA. L. REV. 3io (1938).
4. Since the constitutionality of an Act of Congress was involved, the case was
appealed directly to the Supreme Court from the District Court under the Act of Aug.
24, 1937. 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28 U. S. C. A. § 402.
5. 48 STAT. 798 (1934), I U. S. C. A. §§ 3oi-3o3 (Supp. 1937). This was the
First Municipal Bankruptcy Act.
6. 298 U. S. 513 (936).
7. 85 U. oF PA. L. Ray. i (936).
8. Sar. REP. No. 91i, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 2; see also 86 U. oF PA. L.
Rav. 310 (938).
9. A similar principle was adhered to in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S.
548 (1937) : ". . . Even sovereigns may contract without derogating from their sov-
ereignty. . . . The states are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of Congress, to
make agreements with one another. . . . We find no room for doubt that they may
do the like with Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without im-
pairment' Id. at 597.
io. Instant case at 54.
ii. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 18ig).
12. 298 U. S. 513, 532 (1936).
("7)
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Constitutional Law-Housing as a Public Use Within Constitu-
tional Limitations on the State's Power of Eminent Domain-A tax-
payer filed a bill in equity to test the constitutionality of housing statutes I
providing for the creation of state housing authorities to act in conjunction
with the Federal Housing Authority in constructing and operating low-
cost housing projects. The plaintiff urged chiefly 2 that use of the housing
would not be public and therefore that the land on which the dwellings
were to be built could not be acquired by eminent domain under the Four-
teenth Amendment and the state constitution. Held (Justices Schaffer
and Drew dissenting), that the statutes were constitutional because the
housing would benefit the public and therefore condemnation would be for
a public use. Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 200 At. 834
(Pa. 1938).
It is constitutional dogma that state governments can exercise eminent
domain, under their general police power, for projects involving a public
use.3 Courts, however, have variously defined "public use", some saying
that a project contributing to the general welfare involves a public use,4
and others saying that a use is not public unless it involves a general right
of user by the public.5 Under the former definition the constitutionality
of housing programs can easily be rationalized since slum clearance in-
volves a destruction of focal centers of disease, fires and accidents, and
pernicious moral influences.6 Under the latter definition such programs
must fall since use of the housing is limited to a part only of the public.
Statutes similar to those in the instant case have been passed in thirty-one
states.7  Besides Pennsylvania, the courts of six states have ruled on the
question of their constitutionality and like Pennsylvania all have accepted
the broader definition of public use and have sustained them.s But this is
in sharp contrast to federal court decisions on federal housing statutes, 9
and to one earlier state court decision.10 Moreover, the Pennsylvania cases
have given expression to both tests for determining a public use. 1 It is
I. Housing Cooperation Law, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 35,
§ 1581 et seq.; Housing Authorities Law, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit.
35, § i54I et seq.
2. It was also urged that the statutes entailed unconstitutional legislation for a
special class, delegation of authority, and excess of debt limitations. The court over-
ruled all of these contentions.
3. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 2oo U. S. 527 (i9o6). See (1936)
84 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 902, 903.
4. State ex rel. Twin City Building & Investment Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 13,
176 N. W. 159 (1920). See I NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) 131.
5. Smith v. Cameron, io6 Ore. I, 210 Pac. 716 (1922). See I NicHOLs, EMINENT
DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) 129.
6. See instant case at p. 841.
7. See instant case at p. 836.
8. Opinion of the Justices, 5 U. S. L. WEEK 946 (Ala. 1938); Marvin v.
Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 183 So. 145 (Fla. 1938) ; Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky.
97, 103 S. W. (2d) 65, (1937); State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of New
Orleans, 182 So. 725 (La. 1938); Wells v. Housing Authority of Wilmington, 197 S. E.
693 (N. C. 1938) ; New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 27o N. Y. 333, I N. E.
(2d) 153 (1936).
9. United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1935). A state statute attempting to authorize slum clearance by the Federal
Government was held invalid in United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Detroit,
12 F. Supp. 345 (E. D. Mich. 1935). It should be noted that apart from the court's
theory as to public use, there was in these cases an objection based on the Federal Gov-
ernment's complete lack of power to undertake housing projects. See (1935) 48 HARv.
L. RFv. 1O21.
io. Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611 (1912).
Ii. See Twelfth Street Market Co. v. Pennsylvania & Reading Terminal R. R.,
142 Pa. 58o, 587, 21 At]. 989, 99o (1891) : "To constitute a public use, . . . the pub-
lic must have a right of use"; Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 22o Pa. 388, 393,
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significant, therefore, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case
has adopted the broader statement of the principle, embodied in the
"public welfare" test; for only this view takes into account the high degree
of interdependency of individuals in a mature industrial society.
Conflict of Laws-Constitutionality of Statute Providing for Con-
structive Personal Service on Non-Resident Owner of Real Estate-
Plaintiff brought suit in Pennsylvania against defendant,1 a resident of New
Jersey, for damages arising from a fall on a broken sidewalk abutting prop-
erty in Pennsylvania upon which defendant held a mortgage. A Pennsyl-
vania statute 2 provides for a substituted service 3 which results in personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident owner, tenant, or user of real estate in
accident cases arising out of the use of such real estate. Defendant received
service in the manner prescribed by the statute. Held, that the statute is
not a deprivation of property without due process and the service is valid.
Dubin v. City and Lesher, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 19, 1938, p. i,
col. 2 (Pa. C. P. 1938).
In upholding the constitutionality of this statute in derogation of the
common law, the court has greatly widened the state's jurisdiction in per-
sonata. At common law, neither the ownership of property 5 nor the oc-
currence of operative facts within a state 1 will give the state jurisdiction to
render a personal judgment against the owner or actor. However, modem
statutes have been upheld which have designated certain acts, the perform-
ance of which within the state will subject the non-resident actor to the
personal jurisdiction of that state in all cases growing out of the acts in-
volved. Thus the entering of a special appearance for the purpose of con-
testing the jurisdiction of the court,7 the appointment of an agent to sell
securities.3 or, in the case of corporations, the mere doing of business, 9 have
been upheld by the courts as acts which the legislature can designate as
giving the state personal jurisdiction over the actor in all litigation growing
out of these acts. Particularly important among these statutes are those
69 Atl. 870, 872 (igo8) : "If the proposed improvement tends to enlarge the resources,
increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable
number of the commonwealth, the use is public."
I. Actually, but unimportant to the issue involved, the plaintiff sued the city. The
city then joined Lesher, additional defendant, by sci. fa. proceedings.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 12, § 331.
3. The statute provides that the summons should be sent by registered mail, fifteen
days before the return day, both to the defendant and the Secretary of the Common-
wealth. The return receipts must be attached to and made part of the return of service.
The statute would be unconstitutional unless reasonable notice was provided for the
defendant. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928). However, the defendant's re-
fusal of the registered letter will not make the service bad. Wax v. Van Marter, 124
Pa. Super. 573, i89 Atl. 537 (937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 739.
4. Defendant was a mortgagee in possession. In addition to claiming the act was
unconstitutional, she maintained that she was not within the meaning of it. The court
refused to rule on this because of poor pleadings. Leave was granted to amend the
petition so as to get this clearly before the court. An amended petition to strike off
the service of the sci. fa. was filed on Sept. 27, 1938.
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; Walkock v. Adkins, 60 Okla. 38, 158 Pac.
587 (1916) ; I Bzu. , CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 74.5: GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) §72.
6. Singh v. Rajah of Faridkot, [1894] A. C. 67o; see BEAv_, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) § 84.1 ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 76.
7. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15 (i8go); Western Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S.
261 (1914).
8. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935), 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 921, 48 IiAMv.
L. R v. 1433.
9. St. Clair v. Cox, io6 U. S. 350 (1882); Rosenburg v. Curtis Brown Co., 260
U. S. 516 (1923).
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dealing with non-resident motorists." Although there is some language
in the cases referring to the non-resident's having consented to the juris-
diction, the constitutionality of such statutes is generally said to rest on the
police power of the state exercised to promote the public safety." It would
seem to follow that only such acts as could be regulated under the police
power could be designated as giving the state personal jurisdiction.12 The
present statute might have been sustained on these grounds, but the instant
court reached its result by reasoning that it is just as important that a
non-resident owner of real estate keep it in reasonable repair as it is that
he drive his automobile with due regard for the safety of others. But
certainly there is inherent in the driving of an automobile more danger to
the public than there is in the mere ownership of property. Indeed it is
important that non-resident actors at all times conduct themselves with due
regard to the safety of others. It is possible, therefore, that the instant case
evidences a tendency on the part of the courts toward allowing the state
in which a tort is committed personal jurisdiction over the tort feasors. 3
Contempt of Court-Publication Concerning Pending Cause-
Defendants were cited for contempt of court, after publishing newspaper
editorials praising conviction of a politician for soliciting bribes and of sit-
down strikers, before sentence was passed. The editorials also opposed pro-
bation of union workers who had been convicted of assaulting non-union
men. Held, that the defendants were guilty, because the right to a fair trial
is as sacred as the freedom of the press, and a trial is still pending if there
are "any further judicial acts" to be performed: In re Times-Mirror Com-
pany, et a., 5 U. S. L. WEEK 1530 (Cal. 1938).
During the past few decades the doctrine of summary punishment for
contempt by publication has been widely criticized.' Probably the most
frequent point of attack is the alleged infringement of constitutional guar-
anties of freedom of the press,' the defense set up in the instant case.
Although this argument was frequently sanctioned in the early decisions,8
io. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927), 76 U: OF PA. L. REv. 93, 41 HARv. L.
REv. 94, 26 MicH. L. REv. 212. At least thirty-five states have such statutes. See Culp,
Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934) 32 MIcH. L. REv. 325
(footnote 2 of this article collects the principle articles written in this field).
ii. See Culp, supra note io, at 327.
12. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 85, comment d.
13. Such a rule was suggested in 1929. See Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions
(1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 427.
i. Beale, Criminal and Civil Contempt of Court (1908) 21 HARv. L. Rnv. 161;
Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempt in
"Inferior" Federal Courts (1924) 37 HAlv. L. REv. ioio; Gregory, The Courts and
Free Speech (1913) 8 ILL. L. REv. 141; Laski, Procedure for Constructive Contempt
in England (1928) 41 HAv. L. R.v. 1O31; Yankwich, Use and Abuse of Contempt
Commitments (1931) 65 U. S. L. Rv. 481; and references cited infra note 18. But see
Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law (I935) 48 HARv. L.
REV. 885; Notes and Comment (1931) 65 U. S. L. REv. 475; (1930) 28 MlCn. L. REv.
616. For an exhaustive discussion, see C. H. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF
COURT (1934).
2. See, however, Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States
(1927) 28 CoL. L. REV. 401, 525, suggesting that the guaranty of trial by jury is the
constitutional safeguard primarily involved, and also suggesting that the due process
clause is being violated: "If the sweep of the Fourteenth Amendment is to be broad,
logic requires that it be broad consistently" (id. at 403, n. 13).
3. Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. 395 (Ill. 1842) ; Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45 (1875);
Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. 75, (1845).
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the modem trend is overwhelmingly in the opposite direction.4 Even
statutes limiting the power to punish summarily for contempt to acts com-
mitted in the immediate presence of the court, or so near as actually to
obstruct the court's work, have been generally declared unconstitutional
or construed away.5 Among the types of publication held to be punishable
are those which attempt to intimidate judges,6 are calculated to prejudice
fair and impartial action in a cause then pending,7 would "embarrass the
court" in the administration of justice," or which scandalize the courts, 9
quite apart from the possibility of influencing any decision.' 0 Actually, in
the last analysis most of the decisions are simply concerned with uncom-
plimentary remarks about judges. Thus it may readily be seen that the
very nature and scope of the power lend themselves to tremendous pos-
sibilities of abuse. 1 In justification the courts have long asserted im-
memorial usage and necessity to preserve judicial functioning. 2 But Sir
John Fox, eleven years ago, has conclusively demonstrated the misappre-
hension on which was based the theory of common law precedent as the
origin of the power.' 3 As for the argument of necessity, the federal courts
from 1831 to 1917, and the Pennsylvania courts to this day, have given
effect to statutes abolishing summary punishment for contempt by publica-
tion; 14 yet in neither jurisdiction has respect for judicial authority been
substantially impaired. This would seem to indicate the "necessity" is
more imaginary than real. In the instant case, however, it was not a
question merely of offending the dignity of the court but of prejudicing
the cause of the various defendants. Once granted the correctness of the
4. Patterson v. Colorado, 2o5 U. S. 454 (907); People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195
(1872); 2 BIsHoP, CasmiNAL LAWv (9th ed. 1923) 205.
5. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 385 (1928), Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States, 247 U. S. 402 (917), supplanting State v. Morrill, i6 Ark. 384 (i855)
as the leading case on the interpretation of such statutes. For full discussion see C. H.
THOMAS, op. cit. supra note i, app. B; and Nelles and King, supra note 2, at 554-562.
See also J. L. THOMAS, LAw OF CoxsTRucrvE CONTEMPT (904) 82-83. One of the
few leading exceptions is Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93i) tit. 17,
§§ 2042, 2044; (193) 79 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 497; cf. Judge Patterson's view, Patterson,
Contempt (1932) I PENN. B. A. Q. i8. For a highly interesting situation which has
recently arisen in Pennsylvania, see the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, October 6, 1938,
P. 3, col. 3.
6. McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Ida. i91, 128 Pac. 954 (913).
7. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, i88 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682 0905).
8. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 459 (907).
q. Ex parte Barry, 85 Cal. 6o3, 25 Pac. 256 (i89o); People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195
(872).
io. State v. Hildreth, 82 Vt. 382, 74 Atl. 71 (igog), one of the cases where the
cause to which the publication referred was no longer pending.
ii. Among the least justifiable of the decisions is State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 623,
157 N. E. 769 (927), 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 210, rehearing denied, 200 Ind. 716, 162
N. E. 441 (1929), where a member of the clergy was adjudged guilty of contempt for
criticizing the decisions of certain liquor cases. The majority, in a three-two decision,
treated the case as if the defendant had charged the court with being dominated by the
liquor interests; the two dissenting judges pointed out that the defendant had only said
that the interests were seeking to control the courts, and added that under the doctrine
as laid down by the majority, Abraham Lincoln should have been convicted for con-
tempt for his criticism of the Dred Scott decision: id. at 661, 157 N. E. at 781. This
case w1as characterized as "highly arbitrary, if not illegal" by a writer whose general
conclusions have been, for the most part, set forth with great reserve and objectivity:
C. H. THOMAS, op. cit. supra note x.
12. The leading case, of course, is Respublica v. Oswald, i DalI. 319 (Pa. 1788).
13. Fox, HistoRY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927). It is interesting to note that
although Fox's conclusions have thus far gone unchalleneged, the courts continue to cite
the common law as their justification. See, for instance, Sauer v. Andrews, 115 Cal.
App. 272, 274, I P. (2d) 997, 998 (1931), quoting Briggs v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.
61g, 297 Pac. 3 (93I).
14. See supra note 5.
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doctrine, therefore, its exercise here seems somewhat justified as a sincere
attempt to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial.15 But it must be
admitted that similar occurrences are by no means rare; Clarence Darrow
is said to have remarked that "As the law stands today, there is no im-
portant criminal case where the newspapers are not guilty of contempt of
court day after day." 16 Such use of the power to punish summarily,
however, as exercised in this case, is the exception rather than the rule,
and the possibilities of abuse in protecting judicial sensitivity from adverse
criticism of any sort are tremendously dangerous.'7  Certainly the entire
doctrine should be thoroughly reexamined; and in any event, the less
hazardous course would seem to be a stricter adherence to legislative re-
strictions,' particularly at present when democratic safeguards and lib-
erties must be jealously preserved.
Criminal Law-Evidence--Unconstitutionality of a Statute Per-
mitting Comment by the Judge on the Failure of the Accused to Tes-
tify-An advisory opinion was requested by the state senate on the
constitutionality of a proposed bill ' which would prohibit comment by coun-
sel, but permit the judge, if satisfied at the close of the evidence that a
defendant could contradict material testimony of the prosecution, to instruct
the jury that the defendant's silence could be considered in their delibera-
tions. Held, that the bill would be unconstitutional 2 since it would com-
15. The English decisions tend to deal more with this type of offense, rather than
concentrate on the protection of judicial dignity. (1932) 8I U. OF PA. L. REv. 214. But
the English law is substantially the same. DAwsoN, LAW OF THE PRESS (1927) 94-111;
FISHER AND STRAHAN, LAW OF THE PRESS (2d ed. 1898) 257-266; OSWALD, CONTEMPT
OF COURT (3d ed. i9io) 6. A possible explanation, however, which is usually over-
looked, of the difference in emphasis noticeable in the English cases is that perhaps the
newspapers have been more reticent in their comments concerning the judiciary.
i6. Quoted in Perry, Trial by Newspaper (1932) 66 U. S. L. REv. 374, 379. Perry
believes the source of the trouble is the invasion of politics into the administration of
justice, and his proposed solution is a system of appointed judges for life tenure.
17. Judges have frequently been quick to note the possibility that they might be
influenced by adverse publications, and therefore it naturally follows that such publica-
tions tend to "obstruct the administration of justice". See, for example, People v. Wil-
son, 64 Ill. 195, 214 (1872). Yet it appears impossible to find a single case where the
judge admitted that he actually was so influenced; following the lead of Chief Justice
McKean in Respublica v. Oswald, i Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788), they have seldom recognized
the immediate likelihood that they were prejudiced, even in passing judgment on the
very persons who had attacked them. Human nature being what it is, judges are more
frequently influenced by favorable comment; yet, as Nelles and King point out, supra
note 2, at 547, n. 92, such comment seldom calls forth any rebuke. Many of the cases
are covered by the objection raised by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. U. S., 247 U. S. 402, 424 (1917) : "But a judge of the United States
is expected to be a man of ordinary firmness of character, and I find it impossible to
believe that such a judge could have found in anything that was printed even a tendency
to prevent his performing his sworn duty."
i8. The strongest argument to this effect has been made by Nelles and King,
mpra note 2. See also Chused, Public Comment as Contempt of Court (i93o) I6 ST.
Louis L. REv. 24, and Note (930) i8 CALiF. L. Rxv. i66. For a well-reasoned and
enlightened judicial discussion, see State v. American-News Co., 64 S. D. 385, 266
N. W. 827 (1936).
i. The bill was to amend the present statute which provided that the defendant, at
his request, shall be a competent witness, but that "his neglect or refusal to testify shall
not create any presumption against him". MAss. GEN. LAws (1932), c. 233, § 20, cl. 3.
2. An excellent discussion of both sides of the issue can be found in two articles,
the latter being written in answer to the first. Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Ac-
cused to Testify (932) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 40; Bruce, The Right to Comment ont the
Failure of the Defendant to Testify (1932) 3 MIcHi. L. REV. 226.
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pel the defendant to incriminate himself.- In re Opinion of the Justices,
15 N. E. (2d) 662 (Mass. 1938).
After the decision by the South Dakota court 4 invalidating a statute
permitting the district attorney to comment on the defendant's silence, this
decision by the conservative Massachusetts court is not unexpected. It is
to be regretted because, by adopting the same broad view of the constitu-
tion as the former court, it has blocked needed reform in the law of crim-
inal evidence.5 There is little justification, historically 6 or logically, for
this broad interpretation, as the privilege against self-incrimination was
designed only to prevent compelling the defendant by direct force to fur-
nish the evidence against himself. Enactments in most states T forbidding
an inference from his silence offer convincing proof that the very legislators
who made the defendant a competent witness felt that the constitutions did
not preclude drawing the inference. Furthermore, there is good authority
in other aspects of the law of evidence to restrict the privilege to actual
testimony and to permit real evidence of the defendant's person and ac-
tions. Thus, an inference of guilt can be drawn from the defendant's
failure to deny accusation of a crime made in his presence," from his failure
to account for his possession of stolen goods," and from his flight; 0 and
the courts have sanctioned compulsory exhibition of the person, com-
pulsory finger printing, and wearing of particular clothing." Observing
this tendency to limit the privilege, the legislature drafted a bill permitting
judicial comment, but under restrictions requiring the prosecution to estab-
lish its case substantially before the inference would arise. This negatived
the greatest objection to the reform-that district attorneys would use the
3. MAss. CONST., Part I, art. XII provides: "No subject shall be . . . compelled
to accuse or furnish evidence against himself." RESTATEMENT, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIm-
INAL LAW (Tent. Draft No. I, ig3i) at page 35, has a complete list of all constitu-
tional provisions in the various states. One correction must be made on that compila-
tion, for California by constitutional amendment now permits comment by the judge.
STAT. AND AMEND. TO CAL. CODES (1935) P. 1941.
4. State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178, 266 N. W. 116 (1936), 27 J. Caim. L. 279; Note
(1937) 22 CoR. L. Q. 392.
5. Both the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association have advo-
cated far more radical reform than that involved in the instant case, for both would
allow comment by the district attorney as well as the court. See 9 Paoc. Am. L. INST.
(1931) 202-218; (1934) 2o A. B. A. J. 65I. See also, Knox, Self-Incrimination (1925)
74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139, 148-154; Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing
Self-Incrimination, (igo6) 15 YALE L. J. 127.
6. For the history of the privilege see: 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2250;
Boiarsky, Right of the Accused in a Criminal Case Not to Be Compelled to Be a Wit-
ness Against Himself (1925) 35 W. VA. L. Q. 27.
7. There are forty-one states which have statutory prohibition in one form or an-
other of the drawing of an inference against the defendant from his neglect or refusal
to testify. For a complete list of the statutes see Reeder, supra note 2, at 43, ns. 23-25.
Mr. Reeder's list must be amended as certain changes have been made since his article
was published. South Dakota must be added following the Wolfe case which inval-
idated her statute allowing comment, and California and Vermont must be removed
from the list since California by constitutional amendment, and Vermont by statute now
permit comment by the judge. STAT. AND AMEND. TO CAL. CODES (935) P. 1941; VT.
LAws (935), p. 69. Note also that in Connecticut, although there is a statutory pro-
hibition of comment by the district attorney, by judicial decision the judge has been
authorized to comment on the silence of the accused. State v. Ford, iog Conn. 49o, 146
Atl. 828 (1929).
8. 2 WHARTON, CmMNAL EviDExcE (ilth ed. 1935) io8g, iO98. Note (1938)
115 A. L. R. 1510.
9. 5 Wiamoax EvIDENCE 509.
10. I WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (ilth ed. 1935) 140, 404.
ii. Id. at 6o6. Note also the further limitation that the possibility of prosecution
in another jurisdiction will not enable a witness to invoke the privilege. Id. at 6og.
124 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
inference, rather than their own evidence, for conviction. 12 In spite of the
arguments of history, practice, and policy favoring constitutionality, the
court found it necessary to follow the broad interpretation of the constitu-
tional provision and invalidate the proposed legislation. It is to be hoped
that in the future this view of the constitutional privilege will be rejected
and that similar legislation in other states, limiting the protection to the
guilty offered by the privilege, will be regarded as constitutionally sound."3
Divorce-Construction of Statute Making Separation for a Period
of Years a Ground for Absolute Divorce-Plaintiff deserted his wife,
and, after a period of three years, sued for a divorce under a statute direct-
ing that "When husband and wife have lived apart for three consecutive
years, without cohabitation, the court shall grant an absolute decree of
divorce at the suit of either party." I From a decree granting an absolute
divorce, defendant appealed. Held (three justices dissenting), that the
decree should be reversed with directions to dismiss the complaint, because
the statute contemplates a separation by mutual agreement, not abandon-
ment of one spouse by the other. White v. White, 116 S. W. (2d) 616
(Ark. 1938).
Statutes similar to the one involved in the instant case are becoming
increasingly common.2 They are based on the theory that, where a couple
have lived apart for a long period of time,3 the possibility of reconciliation
is negligible, and the best interests of society and of the parties themselves
will be promoted by an absolute divorce.4 When it is evident that nothing
remains of the original marital bond but the legal relationship, the state
should give up its objections to severance of the union and not force con-
tinuance of a situation fraught with possibilities of harm to the individuals
involved, in the form of physical and mental frustration and their conse-
quences, and to society as a result of crime and economic losses.- The
instant case seems to come within this policy, and probably, as the dissent
stated, the legislature intended the statute to cover such a situation. At
least there is nothing in its terms to exclude such an interpretation and,
under similar statutes, other jurisdictions have so ruled. 6 Furthermore,
granting a divorce in this case would not necessarily injure the wife
12. Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify (1917) 26 YALE L. J.
464, 469.
13. Particularly significant in this respect is that Vermont now has a statute sim-
ilar to the one in question in the Massachusets case, and the Vermont statute has not
as yet been challenged. VT. LAWS (935), p. 69.
I. ARic. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 4381-7.
2. ARIz. REV. CODE ANN. (Courtright, 1936) § 2r79-9; 49 STAT. 539 (D. C. 1935);
Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carrol, 1936) § 2117-2; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 2202;
Md. Laws 1937, c. 396; Nay. STAT. 1931, C. 291, § 3; Tx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1928)
§4629-I; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §982-8; Wis. STAT. (193i)
§ 247.07.
3. The period of separation varies from ten years in Rhode Island to two years in
North Carolina.
4. See BA ~ao, SocIAL INsTiuTioxs (1936) 102; Groves, Hazards of Modern
Marriage (1937) 5 DuK-E B. J. 66, 73; Lichtenberger, Divorce Legislation (1932) I6o
THE ANNALS I16, 12o; Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 763.
5. Smith v. Smith, 54 R. I. 236, 172 Atl. 323 (1934); see BALLARD, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 1oo; GoODSALL, PROBLEMS OF THE FAILnY (Rev. ed. 1936) 410-13; (1938)
2 MD. L. REv. 357.
6. Ward v. Ward, 213 Ky. 6o6, 281 S. W. 8or (1926) ; Best v. Best, 218 Ky. 648,
291 S. W. 1032 (1927) ; Goudeau v. Goudeau, 146 La. 742, 84 So. 39 (192o). Accord:
Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 19o, 23 P. (2d) 559 (I933). Cf. Herrick v. Herrick.
53 Nev. 59, 25 P. (2d) 378 (933) ; Smith v. Smith, 54 R. 1. 236, 172 Atl. 323 (934).
Contra: Parker v. Parker, 21o N. C. 264, 186 S. E. 346 (1936) ; Hyder v. Hyder, 210
N. C. 486, 187 S. E. 798 (1936).
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economically, since, where the suit is based on separation, alimony is
generally awarded the wife, even though the husband is plaintiff, if she
would have been entitled to it had she been plaintiff.7 On the other hand,
it has been argued that the purposes underlying this type of statute are,
first, to legalize the very prevalent collusive divorce,8 and, secondly, to
permit parties who have been separated by agreement, to be divorced with-
out the notoriety which usually accompanies a suit based on the customary
grounds, even though such grounds exist.9 Under this view, the decision
of the court can be justified, because both situations presuppose a mutual
desire for divorce. However, generally, where the legislaive intent has
been thus interpreted, the statute involved has either expressly provided
that the separation be voluntary,10 or has limited the right to sue to the
injured party.1" In the instant case, it would seem that the court was
unwilling to allow the plaintiff to profit by his own misconduct, and there-
fore read the requirement of "separation by agreement" into the statute.1 2
Labor Law-Permissibility under New York Labor Relations
Act of Negotiations with Individual Employees after Appointment
of Exclusive Bargaining Agent-Petitioner appealed from New York
State Labor Relations Board order to bargain with Industrial Insurance
Agents Local 3o,1 which Board had certified as exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative of insurance agents in designated units. Held, that
petitioner should bargain with union, but that the union's exclusive collec-
tive bargaining power should not "prevent negotiation between the peti-
tioner and any of its employees, each acting for himself." Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, N. Y. L. J.,
July 27, 1938, p. 235, col. 4 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
Although the New York Act provides for exclusive collective bargain-
ing with the certified union, there is the further provision "that employees.
directly or through representatives, shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer." 2 There are similar sections in the
six important labor relations acts,2 and the instant court is not alone in
7. See cases collected in Note (1937) iiI A. L. R. 867. See also LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. (Dart, 1932) § i6o.
8. Note (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1121, 1131-33.
9. Feinsinger, Observations on Judicial Administration of Divorce Law in Wiscon-
sin (1932) 8 Wis. L. REv. 27, 39, 40. For another suggested reason for the enactment
of this type of statute, see Zacharias, Suggested Divorce Reforms for Illinois (937)
15 CHI-KENT REV. 114.
io. Md. Laws 1937, c. 396; Campbell v. Campbell, 198 Atl. 414 (Md. 1938). See
Note (1927) 5I A. L. R. 763, for cases interpreting the Wisconsin Statute.
II. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 982-8; Pierce v. Pierce, 120
Wash. 411, 208 P. 49 (1922).
12. It is interesting to compare the court's decision as to the legislative intent in
the statute involved in the principal case, with the decision of the North Carolina Court
in Parker v. Parker, 21o N. C. 264, i86 S. E. 346 (1936), in which the court held
that, under a statute making separation, etc., "under a deed of separation or otherwise"
a ground for divorce (N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) § 1659-a), a separation by mutual
agreement was required, completely ignoring the "or otherwise". In 1937, the North
Carolina legislature amended the statute by striking out "under a deed of separation or
otherwise" (N. C. Pub. Laws 1937, c. 92), indicating that the court's interpretation of
the original statute was erroneous.
i. In re Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and Industrial Insurance Agents, Locaf
30, 2 L. R. REP. 655 (N. Y. L. R. B. 1938).
2. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1937) c. 32, §§ 700, 705.1.
3. 49 STAT. 449, 453, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151, 159 (1935) ; Mass. Acts 1937, c. 436,
§ga; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWs (Cahill, Supp. 1937) c. 32, §§ 700, 705.1; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, §§ 211, 211.7a; Utah Laws 1937, c. 55, § ioa; Wis. Laws
1937, c. 51, § 111.09.
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attempting to give some effect to these provisions.4 Certainly the labor
acts are not entirely clear on the individual employee's capacity to nego-
tiate, and it is understandable that the courts are hesitant to depart any
more than necessary from the traditional concept of freedom of contract. 5
However, the labor relations boards have consistently resisted this inter-
pretation,6 on the theory that it permits circumvention of the collective
bargaining clauses.7 It must be admitted that if individual bargaining were
conducted on a large scale, the whole purpose of the acts would be defeated.
Strikes could be broken, organization frustrated, and the majority bar-
gaining agent's demands ignored almost as effectively, although not so
conveniently, as before the acts were passed." The ultimate issue seems
to be whether the traditional rights of the individual worker must be pro-
tected or whether, due to modern industrial conditions, such rights have
become fictitious 9 and the freedom of Labor can be insured only by enforced
submission of the individual to the organized group. Although clarifica-
tion of the individual's status by the legislature is urgently needed, this
type of labor legislation taken as a whole seems to be based on the latter
philosophy. Hence it would be reasonable for the courts to give greater
weight to the general purpose of these labor acts and to permit individual
bargaining solely in respect to matters which are not properly the subject
of collective bargaining.10 Only in this way can the certified exclusive
representative be truly exclusive in connection with matters in the collec-
tive sphere.
4. See Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 3oo U. S. 515, 548, 557, 559
(1937) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S.
i, 44 (937); National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 96 F. (2d) 721, 724
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Workers, i Prentice-Hall
1937 Labor & Unemployment Ins. Serv. 1 16,113 (Ohio C. P. 1937), where the court
cites the dicta of the Virginia Ry. and Jones and Laughlin cases.
Unless effect is given to these provisions impasses may develop. Cf. Lund v.
Woodenware Workers Union, ig F. Supp. 607, 6ii (D. Minn. 1937), where an em-
ployer was unable to negotiate with a minority union on strike. The usual outcome of
such a situation is a closed shop for the majority union. See comment i L. R. REP.
67 (1937).
5. In Adair v. United States, 2o8 U. S. i61 (igo8), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U. S. i (915), the Supreme Court held that legislation which attempted to limit the
conditions under which an employer might hire or discharge his employees was uncon-
stitutional, since it interfered with his right to freedom of contract, and consequently
was a violation of the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment.
6. In the Matter of Atlas Mills, Inc. and Textile Workers' Union, 3 N. L. R. B.
10 (937) ; In re Federal Carton Corp. and New York Printing Pressmen's Union No.
51, 2 L. R. REP. 65 (N. L. R. B. 1938); In re Williams Mfg. Co. and United Shoe
Workers, 2. L. R. REP. 153 (N. L. R. B. 1938) ; In re National Licorice Co. and Bakery
and Confectionery Workers, 2 L. R. REp. 480 (N. L. R. B. 1938) ; The Collier Case,
i L. R. REP. 616 (N. Y. L. R. B. 1938); i Prentice-Hall 1937 Labor and Unemploy-
ment Ins. Serv. 11 15331.2.
7. See dissenting opinion of Biggs, J., in National Labor Relations Board v. Dela-
ware-New Jersey Ferry Co., go F. (2d) 52o, 52 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937). Also, for inter-
esting comment on this phase of the instant case, see Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug.
30, 1938, p. 4, col. I.
8. ". . . five of the striking employees went back to work, the strike as an
effective bargaining weapon was broken, and a prospect of securing agreement van-
ished." Atlas Mills, Inc. and Textile House Workers Union No. 2269, 3 N. L. R. B.
10, 20 (938).
9. "A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was depend-
ent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the em-
ployer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable
to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential
to give laborers an opportunity to deal on equality with their employer." American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209 (1921).
10. This intent was shown by the House Committee on Labor, H. R. REP. No.
1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) ig, commented on in i Prentice-Hall 1937 Labor and
Unemployment Ins. Serv. ff15353. Also see Note (1936) 4 U. OF CHL L. Rxv. i6g.
RECENT CASES
Taxation-Taxability of Profits Derived by Corporation From
Sale of Its Own Stock-Taxpayer contracted to sell shares of its own
stock to the A Corporation for $5o a share. The market price fell below
$50 and the taxpayer continued to buy shares as they fell and sell them to
the A Corporation. The B. T. A. held that the difference between the
buying price and the selling price was taxable income.' Taxpayer ap-
pealed. Held, that the profits are taxable, but the tax must be computed
on the difference between the value of the shares at the time of the sale and
the sale price. E. R. Sqibb 4 Sons v. Commissioner, 98 F. (2d) 69 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938).
From 1918 until recently the courts and the B. T. A. have held in
conformity with the Treasury Regulations 2 that a corporation realizes no
gain or loss from purchases or sales of its own stock.3 However due to a
growing tendency to discourage stock speculations by corporations the
rule was changed in several decisions to hold that the real nature of the
transaction will be regarded where a corporation deals in its own stock.4
The Treasury Regulations were changed to conform to this rather elusory
standard,5 but due to a technical rule of statutory construction 6 the instant
court refused to accept this change. However, even in the face of the old
regulation which they still consider effective, the court did decide there
was a taxable profit in the instant case. For the guidance of the Board in
determining this profit they laid down the test to be whether or not there
was a difference between the "value" of the stock at the time of the sale
and the sale price. Unfortunately the court did not define the term "value".
If the court means market price then the test could only apply in those
situations where, as in the instant case, the corporation by way of a con-
tract or otherwise was able to secure a premium over and above the exist-
ing market price. On the other hand if the court by "value" means the
book value of the shares, then there is nothing to prevent the corporation
from keeping their books so that the book value would always be above
the sale price and thus under the test there would never be a profit but
rather a deductible loss. Possibly actual value was meant.7  However no
matter what definition of value is accepted, the basis of this test of whether
the corporation has realized a profit is dependent not on whether the cor-
poration as an entity has had a mere physical increase in its total assets,
but whether the individual shareholder's status has been enriched due to an
i. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 36 B. T. A. 26o (1937).
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 543, interpreting the gross income section of the
Revenue Act, 40 STAT. 1057 (I918), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (a) (1934).
3. The leading case adopting this view is Simmons & Hammonds Mfg. Co., i B.
T. A. 8o3 (1925). For an excellent review of the decisions, see Houstin Bros. Co.,
21 B. T. A. 8o4 (ig3o), which overrules New Jersey Porcelain Co., 15 B. T. A. lO59
(1929) and Behlow Estate Co., 12 B. T. A. 1365 (1928). Both these latter cases were
contra to the Simmons case, supra.
4. Commissioner v. S. A. Woods Machine Co., 57 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. Ist, 1932),
reversing, 21 B. T. A. 818 (1930), certiorari denied, 287 U. S. 613 (932) ; Spear &
Co. v. Heiner, 54 F. (2d) 134 (W. D. Pa. 1931). These two latter cases were followed
in Allyne Zerk Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 525 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), which seems
to recognize the new Treasury Regulation; cf. Walville Lumber Co. v. Commissioner,
35 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929). See also Note (1937) 47 YALE L. J. iii.
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 543, as amended by T. D. 4430 (1934).
6. Instant case at page 70. The rule is: If a statute is reasonably susceptible of
two constructions, its re-enactment after an interpretive ruling by a responsible official
amounts to a legislative sanction of the course pursued. See J. R. Reynolds Co. v.
Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) and authorities cited therein.
7. This can be worked out, as a practical matter, by presuming the book value to
represent actual value, but allowing either party to rebut this presumption by showing
that the stated value of the corporation's assets was below or above their real worth.
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increase in the intrinsic worth of his shares." In no other phase of cor-
porate taxation has this proposition been advanced, but perhaps this should
properly be made the basis for all corporate taxation.9 The test adopted
by the Board shows the fundamental weakness of treating the corporation
as an entity. Normally the buyer of treasury shares is merely putting in
enough money to equalize his position with that of the existing share-
holders. Although the price so paid may be-higher than the price paid by
the corporation for the shares due to an increase of surplus in the interim,
it is hard to understand how the corporation, as a group of shareholders
has profited by the transaction when no individual shareholder has profited
thereby. There seems to be no perfect answer to this perplexing problem, 0
and as yet the Supreme Court has not passed an opinion on this issue; but
the decision of the instant court seems to be a step in the right direction.
Trade Regulation-Validity of Statutes Regulating Prices and
Hours in Barber Shops-An Oklahoma I statute provides for the regu-
lation of barber shops by a board. The constitutionality of the provisiQn
empowering the board to fix minimum prices 2 was attacked. Held, that
the statute is a valid exercise of the state police power in that the regula-
tion is reasonably related to the promotion of health, welfare, and comfort
of the community. Herrin v. Arnold, 82 P. (2d) 977 (Okla. 1938).
A proposed Massachusetts statute fixed the time of opening and
closing of barber shops. Held, that the statute was an invalid exercise of
the police power because there was no reasonable relation to public health
and morals. Opinion of the Justices, 5 U. S. L. WEEK 1243 (Mass. 1938).
Both courts agree that barber shops may be properly regulated tinder
the police power if the regulation bears a reasonable relation to public
health and morals. While there is much support for the view expressed
in the Massachusetts case,' the Oklahoma case is the first case to find a
reasonable relation to health sufficient to uphold price-fixing in barber
shops.4 However, in both cases it is questionable whether public health
was the underlying factor. For example, the Oklahoma act indicates that
its real purpose is to regulate competition, provide machinery for the
settlement of labor disputes, and generally help the trade through present
8. Cf. J. R. Reynolds Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
But see Borg v. International Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). See also
Note (1937) 47 YALE L. J. III.
9. Cf. First Chrold Corp. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938),
which suggests as a test to determine whether a gain is an income gain or a capital gain,
whether or not it is distributable out of profits.
io. See 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FED. INc mE TAXATION (1934) § 26.99.
I. Okla. Laws 1937, C. 24, art. 2.
2. Id. at § 12.
3. In re Scaranino, 7 Cal. (2d) 309, 6o P. (2d) 288 (1936) ; Denver v. Schmid,
98 Colo. 32, 52 P. (2d) 388 (1935) ; State ex tel. Pavlik v. Johannes, 194 Minn. IO,
259 N. W. 537 (1935) ; and other cases cited in the Massachusetts case at 1243. There
are only three minority decisions: Feldman v. Cincinnati, 2o F. Supp. 531 (S. D. Ohio
1937); Falco v. Atlantic City, 99 N. J. L. ig, 122 Atl. 61o (1923) ; Wilson v. Zanes-
ville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N. E. 187 (1935.) A Phila. Ordinance similar to the Mass.
statute was declared unconstitutional. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 27, 1938, p. I,
col. I.
4. Contra: Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254, aff'd, 233 Ala. 622, 173
So. 266 (1937), where the court used public interest language to distinguish it from
the Nebbia case; State ex tel. Ives, 123 Fla. 402, 167 So. 394 (1936), where the court
said that barber shops could not be regulated because they were not a paramount in-
dustry; Duncan v. Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N. W. 547 (936).
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economic conditions.5 Yet, courts, in deciding the constitutionality of such
police power legislation, have been prone to rationalize in terms of busi-
nesses affected with a public interest 6 or promotion of public health, morals,
or welfare.7 Initially, such categories were applied with some factual
justification; 8 today they have been applied indiscriminately to new situa-
tions without explanation and have become merely a screen for the under-
lying factors.9 More recently, the U. S. Supreme Court has adopted a
more general rationale determining whether the legislation is reasonable
and not expressly prohibited by the Constitution.' ° The exact limitations
of these holdings are not quite clear but they may be taken as an indication
that the present Supreme Court will not allow the "due process" and
"equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to block legisla-
tion for which there is a reasonable economic justification. Such a view
is not only a more sensible interpretation but also will convey more hon-
estly than the older language the real reasons considered by the courts in
reaching their conclusions.
Trade Regulation-Invalidity of Pennsylvania Statute Regulat-
ing Retail Sale of Gasoline-Plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement
of a statute requiring retail gasoline operators to post prices, and for-
bidding the giving of rebates, discounts, or anything of value to purchasers
of gasoline in return for sales.' Held, that those provisions which
prevent the giving of rebates, discounts, or anything of value to purchasers
are unconstitutional and void, because, inter alia, they deprive the plain-
tiffs of their property without due process of law contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Sperry &
Hutchinson Company and Alfred Bayley v. Boardman, Secretary of Reve-
nue and Margiotti, Attorney General, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 8,
1938, p. 1, col. 5 (Pa. C. P. 1938).
In so far as the statute in the instant case resulted in the fixing of
gasoline prices,2 the court in declaring it unconstitutional was deciding
squarely within case authority as it stands in the federal courts. Directly
in point is Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana 3 wherein the Su-
preme Court invalidated a Tennessee statute4 which gave the commis-
5. Although public health language is used in the act, the economic argument is
given greater stress. It may be that the health language was inserted merely to aid in
having the act declared constitutional. See Okla. Laws 1937, c. 24, art. 2, § i.
6. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) (warehouses) ; German Alliance Insurance
Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914) (insurance).
7. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
8. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, i97 U. S. ii
9. See the opinion of Justice Roberts in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 532,
536 (I934) and the discussion of the Adkins case in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U. S. 379, 398 (1937).
io. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934) ; West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 399 (1937). See also CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SU-
PREmE COURT (1934) 52 et seq.; Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some
Reflections on Nebbia v. New York (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 401; Note (I934) 82 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 619; (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 780.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 58, § 16I et seq.
2. The court in the instant case reasoned that the prohibition of rebates and dis-
counts, in that it prevented the dealer from preferring cash or short term credit custom-
ers, had the effect of fixing his prices at the level of those placed on long term pur-
chasers.
3. 278 U. S. 235 (1929), 38 YALE L. J. 774, 17 CALrF. L. REV. 309; see Old Dear-
born Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 192 (1936).
4. Pub. Acts Tenn. 1927, c. 22.
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sioner of finance and taxation the power to fix gasoline prices and pro-
hibited rebates, on the grounds that gasoline was not "affected with public
interest". 5 The phrase, "affected with public interest", used as a standard
in deciding which industries could be subjected to price regulation and
interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean "devoted to public use and . . .
in effect, granted to the public"," was never immune from criticism. That
this criticism should have been expressed chiefly in dissents by Justices
Brandeis, Stone, and Holmes,7 who are today delivering, or by their
writings inspiring, majority rather than minority opinions,8 would prob-
ably not have been sufficient reason for the court in the instant case to have
decided contrary to the direct authority of the Williams case. However,
there is good reason to believe that the principles upon which the Williams
case was decided have been abandoned by the Supreme Court in the
majority opinion of Nebbia v. New YorkY While the holding of the
latter case is not factually in point, the ratio decidendi of the opinion seems
clearly to indicate an altered view of the meaning of "affected with public
interest". In the light of this evident revision of premises on the part of
the Supreme Court, the following by the instant court of the Williams case,
which was based on the older view of the public-interest standard, seems a
questionable application of the rule of stare decisis.10
Trade Regulation-Validity of State Regulation of Photogra-
phers to Protect Against Fraud and Imposition-Defendant was
indicted for practicing commercial photography without a license, in viola-
tion of a statute 1 authorizing a Board of Examiners to license, after ex-
amination, anyone who qualified as to competency, ability, and integrity.
2
Held (two justices dissenting), that it is in the public interest, and within
the police power 3 to regulate the practice of photography, since it is an
5. There are two federal district court decisions-United States v. Mills, 7 F.
Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1934) and United States v. Superior Products, Inc., 9 F. Supp.
943 (D. Idaho I935)-testing the constitutionality of the Petroleum Code of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. §7O1 et Seq.
(1937). Art. 5, rule 3, 11114, 5, 6 and 7, of the Code, identical with the Pennsylvania
statute of the instant case, were put in dispute. Neither case discusses the gasoline in-
dustry as affected with public interest; yet both declare the Code provisions unconsti-
tutional as violative of the due process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments, seemingly because they attempt to regulate intrastate commerce.
6. Justice Sutherland in Tyson & Bro., Inc. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 434 (927),
75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 778, 4o HAv. L. REV. 40, 25 MIcH. L. Rxv. 880. The fullest
explanation of what "affected with public interest" once meant to the Supreme Court
will be found in Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (923).
7. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U. S. 262, 28o (1932) (Brandeis, I.);
Tyson & Bro., Inc. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 447 (927) (Stone, J.); id. at 445
(Holmes, I.).
8. See Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, x936 Term (1937) 86
U. oF PA. L. REv. 3&
9. 291 U. S. 502 (934). "So far as the requirement of due process is concerned
a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."
Id. at 537. "The phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean
no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for public
good." Id. at 536. See Recent Case comment in this issue of the RvmrEw at
lo. Cf. (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 546; 86 U. OF PA. L. RLv. 9o6.
I. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) §§ 7007 (1)-7oo7 (29).
2. Id. § 7007 (IO). Licenses were to be granted without examination to photog-
raphers engaged in the practice for one year before passage of the Act, id. § 7007 (18).
3. On the police power generally see 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImrrATIoNs (8th
ed. 1927) c. 16; and cases collected in 6 R. C. L. 2o3 et seq.
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occupation requiring skill, involving a fire hazard, and capable of lending
itself to the perpetration of fraud. State v. Lawrence, i97 S. E. 586
(N. C. 1938).
This case is of interest in that it validates a statute which goes beyond
mere regulation of the business itself,4 regulating instead its personnel as
to responsibility, character and knowledge.5 Similar legislation has been
upheld with respect to professions generally,6 and to businesses thought
to be peculiarly susceptible to improper influences because a fiduciary
relationship is involved,7 or because the business has been the medium of
considerable fraud.8 Broader application has encountered considerable
opposition on the theory that to prevent a person from engaging in a
lawful and innocuous business because of his moral character or reputation
is an arbitrary invasion of private rights.9 And where, as in the instant
case, the legislation is supposedly for protection against fraud, those who
regard with apprehension the encroachment of this type of legislation on
private rights, contend that if occasional opportunity for fraud is to be the
test, legislative regulation of personnel would be unrestricted, for there is,
perhaps, no business or profession which does not offer peculiar oppor-
tunities for reprehensible practices.' 0 Furthermore, there is always the
danger that this pretext might be used to disguise what is essentially class
legislation prompted by a particular group of tradesmen to restrict admis-
sion into their field. Certainly the state may protect its citizens from the dis-
honesty, incompetence, and irresponsibility of those with whom they deal; ".
but how far the state may go in this policy of protecting the unwary from
imposition remains an open question,12 to which the extreme position of
this case is a possible though unpromising solution.
4. Regulation of a particular business or industry is often justifiable for economic
reasons--". . as a method of correcting evils, which . . . could not be expected
to right themselves through the ordinary play of the forces of supply and demand... '
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 518 (1934). See Recent Case comments in this
issue of the Rzvimv at
5. See McCarty, Protecting the Public: Encroachment of Social Legislation on
Private Rights (925) 1i A. B. A. J. 36, H12, 115; MacChesney, Legal Regulation of
the Personnel of Business (1924) 58 Am. L. REv. i.
6. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. H14 (889) (physicians) ; State v. DeVerges,
153 La. 349, 95 So. 805, 27 A. L. R. 1530 (1923) (accountants) ; Douglas v. Noble, 261
U. S. 165 (1923) (dentists).
7. Payne v. Kansas ex rel. Brewster, 248 U. S. 112 (1918) (commission mer-
chants) ; People ex rel. Schwab v. Grant, 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. 964 (18i) (auc-
tioneers).
8. LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465 (1919) (insurance agents) ; Bratton v.
Chandler, 260 U. S. i1o (1922) (real estate brokers). Contra: Rawles v. Jenkins, 212
Ky. 287, 279 S. W. 350 (1925).
9. "Broad as is the police power, its limit is exceeded when the state undertakes
to require moral qualifications of one who wishes to engage or continue in a business
which, as usually conducted, is no more dangerous to the public than any other ordinary
occupation of life." Rawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 292, 279 S. W. 350, 352 (925).
But see Riley v. Chambers, i8i Cal. 589, 593, 185 Pac. 855, 856 (i919). It is generally
recognized that a state cannot, under the guise of protecting the public, impose unrea-
sonable and arbitrary restrictions upon lawful occupations. Bessette v. People, 193 Ill.
334, 62 N. E. 215 (IpoI) (horseshoers) ; Dasch v. Jackson, 17o Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534
(936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. io24 (paperhangers) ; State exr rel. Sampson v. Sheridan,
25 Wyo. 347, 170 Pac. i (ii8) (cement contractors).
lo. "There are those lacking in moral character connected with all trades and
callings. Good morals cannot be created by legislation." Instant case at 593. See
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 594 (1917).
Ii. See Cheadle, Government Control of Business (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 550.
12. See Hornaday v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 354, 362, 208 Pac. 228, 231 (1922).
